Learning from Prentice and Peterson
A week before the remarkable upset of the Alberta Progressive Conservative government after 44 consecutive years in power, one commentator saw a striking parallel to an election twenty-five years earlier when David Peterson’s Ontario Liberals went down to an equally shocking defeat. Janet Brown, an Alberta pollster and political commentator for the CBC, noted that both governments, banking on large leads in the polls shortly before the election call had opportunistically called snap elections and had then been decisively rejected by the voters.
But the similarities between the two elections go much deeper and may provide lessons to federal parties seeking our votes in October. Here are circumstances common to both the Alberta and Ontario elections: recession is looming and jobs are threatened, but both governments focus on balancing their budgets rather than stimulating the economy; despite this failure to address voters’ economic concerns, both government parties initially retain large leads over their opponents in the polls; moreover, the main opponents to their political right are in disarray and the main opponent on the political left has never formed a government. It seems an opportune time for the ruling parties to call a snap election and cement their large legislative majorities.
But, once the election is called, those healthy leads in the polls melt away. Worse, a viable alternative emerges as the leader of the NDP performs strongly in the televised leaders’ debate and that party surges to the lead in the polls. The government is defeated and the Premier resigns as party leader.
There were, of course, significant differences between the two elections. In contrast to the Alberta PC dynasty, the Peterson Liberals had been in power only five years. Unlike the Alberta PCs they had not been threatened with overwhelming defeat just over a year prior to the election call. And their last pre-election budget came more than three months rather than less than two weeks prior to that call.
With all this in mind, the chronology of the Alberta PC dynasty’s fall is worth examining, referencing similarities to the Peterson Liberals’ 1990 defeat.
Extensive public opinion research conducted over the past eighteen months illustrates the roller coaster ride which took the PCs from near certain defeat to Wild Rose during the dying days of Alison Redford’s leadership, to a strong recovery during the first months of Jim Prentice’s leadership, then down to defeat at the hands of Rachel Notley’s New Democrats.
In early March 2014, just prior to Redford’s resignation as Premier and party leader, a Think HQ poll showed the Wild Rose Party overwhelmingly ahead of the PCs by 46% to 19%, with the Liberals and NDP at 16% and 15% respectively. In late August and early September 2014, just prior to Prentice’s election as PC leader, the Wild Rose lead over the PCs had narrowed to four percentage points (33% vs. 29%). Immediately following Prentice’s election, the PCs won four by-elections on October 27. An Insights West poll in late November and early December 2014 showed the PCs back in front of Wild Rose by 35% to 29%, with the Liberals at 15% and the NDP at 16%. In early December, the PC resurgence seemed cemented when nine Wild Rose members, including then-leader Danielle Smith, crossed the floor of the legislature to join their former opponents.
Just as a rise in the provincial unemployment rate from 5.2% to 6.7% in the six months prior to the Ontario election had unsettled voters in that province, similar economic angst was generated in Alberta by a precipitous drop in oil prices from $93.29 in early September 2014 to $53.27 by the end of the year.
Despite this, the floor-crossing by a majority of the Wild Rose MPPs in early December restored the PCs to a level of support even higher than they had attained in the April 2012 general election. By mid-February 2015, an Environics poll showed the PCs with 46% of the popular vote compared to 18% for the Liberals, 17% for the NDP and 16% for Wild Rose. These data suggested voters were about to give the PCs that most rare of political gifts, a second chance. Similarly, in Ontario when the election was called at the end of July 1990 the Liberals stood at 50% in the polls and the Progressive Conservatives had just elected a new leader in Mike Harris.
However, the Alberta PCs still had to face the challenge of bringing in a budget reflecting the impact of the sharp fall in oil revenue royalties. The budget tabled on March 26 offered little relief to voters anxious about their economic prospects. It proposed several tax increases, sharply cut spending on public services, and still projected a deficit of some $5 billion. Similarly, the Peterson Liberals in April 1990 had presented a balanced budget with no measures to stimulate employment.
A poll taken almost immediately after the Alberta budget (March 27-30) by Insights West showed the PCs now only narrowly leading Wild Rose by 31% to 27%, with the NDP at 22% and the Liberals at 14%. Despite this evidence of the budget’s unpopularity, Prentice decided to call an early election even though he was not required to go to the polls for another year.
The early election call was not well-received by voters. A poll taken in early April by the Forum organization showed Wild Rose leading the PCs by 31% to 27%, with the NDP at 26% and the Liberals at 12%. At this point it was clear that the electorate was looking for an alternative to replace the PCs. Who that alternative would be was soon decided.
The final key event in the collapse of the PC dynasty was the Leaders’ Debate on April 23rd. A pedestrian performance by new Wild Rose leader Brian Jean and a strong one by NDP leader Rachel Notley resulted in the “Time for a Change” vote coalescing behind the New Democrats. Similarly, the Ontario leaders’ debate in 1990 led to a surge in support for Bob Rae’s New Democrats. A poll taken by Think HQ from April 26-28 put the NDP at 39%, Wild Rose at 27%, the PCs at 20% and the Liberals at 9%.
Between that date and the election, the PCs modestly rebounded from this level, but the NDP share held steady while the Wild Rose and Liberal vote shares continued to fall. The election-day result in the popular vote was NDP 40.6%, PC 27.8%, Wild Rose 24.2% and the Liberals 4.2%. Except for the NDP, all parties had a much smaller share of the vote than in the previous general election. Despite their decline in popular support, Wild Rose made a net gain of four seats because in Northern Alberta (outside of Edmonton) the PC share of the vote fell much more than theirs. Similarly, in Ontario, the PCs gained four seats from their 1987 total despite a decline in their share of the popular vote. In only four of the eighty-seven constituencies did the Wild Rose share of the overall vote increase compared to 2012. The result was thus not just a rejection of the PCs but also of Wild Rose.
From this chronology it is clear that the three fatal errors of the Prentice government were its failure to address the economic concerns of voters shaken by the precipitous decline in the price of oil, an over-reliance on the disarray of the party to their right, and their dismissal of the threat posed by the NDP. These errors led them to repeat the Peterson government’s strategic blunder of cynically calling an early election on the assumption that there was no viable alternative to their continued rule. The voters begged to differ and moved efficiently to give each province its first NDP government.
What are the lessons for the federal parties, particularly as Statistics Canada has just reported economic contraction in the first quarter? First, in times of economic uncertainty voters will value vigorous action to support growth and jobs more than balancing the budget. Second, relying on voters to react to economic uncertainty by re-electing a tested leader in preference to untested alternatives may prove a losing strategy when that leader ignores the popular mood. Third, the voters can be very efficient and ruthless in finding an alternative to a cynical government which seems more interested in manipulating them for partisan advantage than addressing their real needs and concerns.